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Abstract  
The implications for analysis of innovation in construction of theoretical developments in 
industrial organisation are considered in this research, as an attempt to outline a new 
approach to construction innovation incorporating the ideas found in knowledge based, 
technology centred models. The paper firstly summarises characteristics of the construction 
industry, focusing on their effects on innovation, before surveying some of the ideas about 
the sources of innovation and the expansion and application of knowledge. Construction can 
be seen as an industry with limited scope for knowledge externalities, where the 
procurement methods used by the industry‟s clients do not pay for innovation. The following 
discussion uses recent developments in the research on the economics of innovation and 
industrial organization theory, such as research intensity and the endogenous sunk costs in 
competitive, fragmented, low research intensity industries. The effects on R&D of 
procurement methods and on industry structure are discussed, with a focus on the 
appropriability of innovations and the role of the client on the Heathrow Terminal 5 project. 
The paper concludes that the procurement methods used for building and construction 
projects appears to be a determining factor in the level of innovation in the construction 
industry.  
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Introduction  
Whilst the construction industry has developed over the years there is increasing pressure to 
become more innovative and deliver better value for money for clients. However there are 
certain characteristics of the industry that appear to slow progress and make innovation 
difficult, because the particular interplay of technological change and industry adaptation and 
development has characteristics unique to building construction.  
 
Product innovation is the introduction of new materials and/or components into the 
constructed product, and there has been a great deal of this form of innovation in recent 
decades. Its counterpart, process innovation, is generally more difficult to manage and deals 
with the development of new organisational structures, management methods, and other 
techniques or actions that improve business processes and competitiveness. The 
construction industry‟s sense of its history, with strong craft traditions and focus on individual 
projects, has significantly affected efforts to improve the constructed product in terms of cost, 
time and quality (Woudhuysen and Abley 2004).  
 
Innovation in the construction industry has been a focus of research since Rosefielde and 
Mills (1979). By the commonly accepted measures of innovation, such as patents, 
technological research papers, introduction of new products or process improvements 
(Freeman and Soete 1997: 7-8), the construction industry has a record of very low 
identifiable innovation and has thus been viewed as a technological laggard, with a slower 
adoption of new technology and lower levels of research and development (R&D) and 
innovation than other industries (Miozzo and Dewick 2002). Although there are good 
arguments to the contrary, Winch (2003) for example argues that the comparison between 
construction and manufacturing is inherently biased against construction if R&D is used as 
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the criteria, this is nonetheless a widely held view. One issue that this debate raises is 
whether the determinants of innovation and the rate of technological advancement in 
construction are well understood. Using Hobday‟s (1998) ideas on innovation in complex 
systems, as developed by Gann and Salter (2000), it is may be that many of the significant 
factors influencing innovation and development of technological capabilities in construction 
are found in aspects of custom and practice that are taken for granted by the industry.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to look at the R&D intensity and level of innovation that 
characterizes the construction industry, and relate these to the procurement systems and 
market structure in the industry.  This discussion covers the characteristics of the 
construction industry and innovation, the relationship between R&D and procurement, R&D 
and industry structure, and the difficulty of achieving returns on R&D in an industry that is 
fragmented and highly dispersed.  The implications of these factors for construction industry 
development are discussed.  
 
Industry Characteristics and R&D  
Construction was described as a heterogeneous, widely dispersed industry, where no two 
products share the same characteristics, with limited scope for learning curve benefits and 
productivity growth associated with them by Cassimatis (1970). Construction offers a 
customised product with unique characteristics: immobility, complexity, durability, costliness, 
and a high risk of failure (Nam and Tatum 1988). There is little direct repetition, individual 
projects are designed and built to serve a particular function or meet a special requirement. 
Although many design and process skills are commonly used, the outputs differ and this 
impacts substantially on the efficiency and economies of scale of the construction process, 
which in turn significantly influences innovation and technological development rates 
(Hobday 2000).  
 
Tatum‟s papers focused on advantages and constraints to innovation in construction, and 
despite being two decades old this work captures many of the key features of the discussion 
raised by more recent efforts such as Reichstein et. al. (2005), Fairclough (2002), or 
Slaughter (1998). Tatum (1986) identified seven features of the construction industry that he 
claimed as advantages for innovation. Construction project teams are presented with high 
levels of necessity and challenge, which promotes innovation by forcing examination of new 
technologies for each project. Integration of engineering, design and construction can 
simplify the construction process and decrease cost. The low capital investment typical of 
construction firms allows high flexibility for the adoption of new technologies. A pool of 
technologically experienced personnel provides depth of knowledge. The strong emphasis 
on process limits barriers to imitation, because new processes can spread rapidly without 
patent restraints (but this may also discourage innovation). Lastly, construction production 
processes do not create rigid restraints (Slaughter 1993 generally followed this approach).  
 
Nam and Tatum (1988) compared the characteristics of constructed products with those of 
manufacturing, arguing that five specific differences limit the development of construction 
technology. These are: immobility, complexity, durability, costliness and high degree of 
social responsibility. Their effect is to create conditions for production processes that result 
in a „locked system‟ in which innovation becomes difficult (Reichstein et. al. 2005 also used 
some of these characteristics in their analysis, which reached a similar conclusion). Dubois 
and Gadde (2002) also argued the temporary character of project-based construction 
hindered innovation. 
 
Five other characteristics of the construction industry were later identified by Tatum (1989) 
as being constraints to innovation. The low capital intensity of the industry limits its interest in 
investment for automation. If a firm has adequate market share and profitability then 
pressure to innovate is reduced. The institutional framework is not supportive of innovation 
(the number of firms, the legal incentives for technological inertia, regulatory influences, and 
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craft organization of labour). Building cycle volatility affects capital investment and 
economies of scale, and suppliers have not created technological improvements in the 
equipment and tools used by construction.   
 
Tatum's analysis is descriptive of the construction industry and remains representative of 
much of the research on models of innovation in the industry to date, but lacks an 
explanation of how innovation occurs, or could occur in the industry. Reichstein et. al. (2005) 
identify what they call ‟organisational liabilities‟ for innovation and low demand for innovation 
from clients and the market. Similarly, Manly and Mcfallan (2006) found the business 
strategies of individual firms more important than markets or marketing strategies for 
innovating firms or organisations.  
 
Gann (2003: 554) cites Bowley (1960) as showing that construction is an adopter of 
innovations from other industries, rather than a source of innovation. Bowley‟s work “shows 
that demand for new types of buildings is usually more important in stimulating radical 
technical and organizational innovation than the need to erect better and cheaper buildings 
to accommodate existing functions. She also shows that innovation in basic materials, 
originating from outside the building industry and with markets far wider, play an important 
role in the evolution of construction.”  
 
None of this provides an explanation of the construction industry‟s record of innovation that 
is grounded in the broader theories of innovation available, in order to identify the most 
important factors at work. The industry characteristics approach, even when done with the 
detail of Manley and Kajewski (2011) for example, works better at the level of firms rather 
than the industry. This paper therefore develops a model of construction innovation in a 
revised framework, identifying procurement methods as the driver or inhibitor of innovation. 
The argument is on two levels. Firstly, at the level of industry structure, the relationship 
between innovation and concentration is discussed. The issue here is whether the research 
intensity of construction is an outcome of industry competition rather than a requirement, as 
in high research intensity industries. Secondly, the issues of appropriateness of research 
and innovation revenues and treatment of knowledge externalities are considered in the 
context of procurement methods used.  
 
Characteristics of Innovation and R&D  
Although not in a formal model, Schumpeter (1942) argued economic development is a 
dynamic process, occurring discontinuously over time as his 'perennial gales of creative 
destruction' drive ongoing change of the economic structure, driven by waves of product 
innovation that sweep away old industries, old goods, and old services (Schumpeter 1942: 
81-87). As the pace of diffusion of a particular innovation slackens so will the rate of 
economic development. In the search for profits, a better innovation will be created, allowing 
the development process to repeat the cycle. The main agents for change were 
entrepreneurs, as distinct from capitalists, innovators, and managers of production and 
distribution.  
 
Two ideas of Schumpeter are particularly important in the context of this paper: the impact of 
economic incentives on the development of new technology, which makes clear the 
endogenous nature of the growth process; and, linkages between investment and other 
areas of the economy through diffusion of technologies. The development of new technology 
has significant costs, and Schumpeter's emphasised the importance of the rate of return in 
determining investments in innovations. Schumpeter recognised that investment in R&D was 
a calculated risk for the firm but, if successful, a benefit to society as a whole.  
 
The concept of linkages and diffusion was used to develop a theory of growth through 
leading industrial sectors with strong linkages to other industries. Initial investment creates 
knowledge for the investor and others to make more informed decisions about future 
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investments.  The 'leading sectors' in this theory are those that generate the most 
externalities and where diffusion of technologies to other industries occurs most rapidly 
(Romer 1990). This „new growth theory‟ made technology endogenous by bringing 
technological progress inside these models and allowing innovators to capture the benefits 
of their R&D. 
 
Research in Intensity  
There are major differences between industries in rates of both technological progress and 
productivity growth. Efforts have been made to find both theoretical and empirical 
explanations of the factors that drive these differences, and one explanation is R&D 
intensity, or the degree of innovation that is found in one industry compared to another. 
Research intensity is typically measured by R&D as a percentage of sales or income.  
 
R&D intensity in an industry is determined by two key variables. One is "technological 
opportunity", which determines the productivity of R&D and the opportunities that are 
available for innovation. The other is the ability of innovating firms to "appropriate" a 
significant share of the economic value created by innovation, or to capture the externalities 
created through new knowledge. However, although both these variables influence R&D 
intensity of firms in an industry, only technological opportunity will affect the rate of 
technological advance in an industry in the long-run, even if both opportunity and 
appropriability influence R&D intensity .  
 
“Differences across industries in their R&D intensities tend to be quite durable. This 
suggests that, to the extent that these are the major determining variables, differences 
across industries and technological opportunities and inappropriability conditions tend to be 
persistent." (Nelson and Wolff 1997: 207). Nelson and Wolff propose cross industry 
differences in technological opportunities are due to R&D opportunities differing between 
industries. In turn, differences between industries in technological progress will be driven by 
differences in R&D intensity, appropriability and available opportunities. Their theory is that 
industries with high R&D intensity and technological opportunity must have a high rate of 
new technological opportunities to make up for those that are being exhausted (see Nelson 
and Winter 1982).   
 
In the industrial organization or industry economics literature, industries are usually seen in 
terms of a number of firms which advance along a single technological trajectory, and these 
firms compete in enhancing the quality of their individual versions of the same basic product 
(homogeneity of product). In this case, firms make decisions on how much R&D to finance, 
and apply that R&D to product development. This view fits some industries well, however 
many industries encompass several groups of products rather than a large number of 
versions of a single product (Sutton 1991). The products may be close substitutes in 
consumption, but embody different technologies, so R&D projects that enhance products in 
one group may generate huge spillovers for products in other groups.  
 
Such complex overlapping patterns of substitutability have bedeviled industrial organization 
analysis for decades, since Chamberlin (1932) first developed the definition of an industry as 
limited by the scope for substitution between products, where industries were defined by 
their product. If industries are broken into separate sub-industries in order to address this 
problem, the choice in R&D spending can be between any number of technologies for the 
development of different groups of products. The products may be close or distant 
substitutes for products of firms on other technological trajectories. Both of these linkages 
operate on the demand side. When the linkages are strong they reflect the presence of 
scope economies in R&D, where the linkages are weak these scope economies will be 
absent and there will be a low degree of substitution across sub-markets.  
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R&D and Market Structure  
The degree of monopoly power exercised by the largest firms in an industry is expressed in 
the concentration ratio, which is the degree to which an industry is dominated by the largest 
firms. Typically the concentration ratio uses the largest four firms in an industry, ranked by 
market share or sales as a percentage of total industry sales. The definition of the 
concentration ratio is the percentage of industry total sales (other measures are capacity, 
output, employment or value added) accounted for by the largest firms. The extent of control 
over prices is determined by the intensity of competition in a market, which is, in turn, 
determined by entry barriers, the number of firms and type of product. The effects of 
competition from new firms and new ideas drive change and development. Thus industries 
with rapid changes in technology and/or aggressive new entrants are likely to be those 
where competition drives firms toward greater efficiencies and innovative methods.  
 
Sutton (1999) in his development of a theory of market structure and concentration, 
suggests the effect of R&D spending on the technological trajectory of industries is crucial. 
Where the degree of substitutability across products associated with different R&D 
trajectories is high, concentration will necessarily be high, because if all firms have a low 
market share an increase in R&D spending will be profitable, and the high spending firm can 
capture sales from low spending rivals on its own trajectory and on others. Sutton shows that 
under these circumstances, the number of trajectories along which firms will operate is 
small, since low spending firms are vulnerable to increases in R&D spending by rivals. On 
the other hand, if the degree of substitution across products is low, then in spite of the 
effectiveness of R&D spending, concentration may be low. "This can only happen if there 
are many product groups, associated with different independent R&D trajectories. Here, 
escalation yields poor returns, since outspending rivals can lead only to the capture of sales 
from products in a single, small product group" (Sutton 1999: 13).  
 
In Sutton's analysis it turns out that industries or sub-industries with a low R&D to sales ratio 
can have a low level of concentration, and this can continue indefinitely. The industries 
where there are a large number of firms in an increasing market, characterised by buyers 
who place different relative weights on different aspects of technical performance (product 
attributes), and many alternative technologies are available for those products, leads to a 
market where there is an indefinite number of firms, each with a small market share. For an 
industry with low R&D spending, Sutton's theory predicts the concentration ratio will be low 
and that the level of concentration will decrease as the size of the market increases. For 
industries where the R&D to sales ratio exceeds a high threshold value, Sutton's theory 
predicts concentration will increase as the spending on R&D increases. In a low R&D 
intensity industry, the market share of the largest firm will be relatively small, in a high R&D 
intensity industry the market share of the largest firm can be very high (Sutton 1999: 14-16).  
 
Procurement and Innovation  
How can the key issues identified here be addressed? The roles of appropriability, patterns 
of substitutability, the importance of R&D intensity in determining concentration and the risks 
associated with innovation for clients, these are a set of mutually reinforcing factors that 
work against innovation and R&D for many, perhaps the majority of construction industry 
firms. The answer proposed here is that the best way to increase innovation lies in the 
methods and systems used to procure building and construction projects. That is a broad 
generalisation that needs to be supported by evidence and argument, so the discussion 
below covers two cases where procurement and innovation can be seen to be closely 
related. 
 
The first case is the difference between traditional procurement and design and build (D&B). 
For the building and construction industry the methods used for tendering and procurement 
of projects are important determinants of the level and form of competition in the industry, 
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and distinguish the industry from many others where competition is through marketing 
campaigns, new products and so on (de Valence 2011). 
 
Craig (1997a) concludes tendering rules or codes have been developed to maintain the 
integrity of the bidding process, not to encourage innovation. Craig (1997b) then argues that 
„alternative tenders‟ are potentially valuable to both clients and contractors, and to society at 
large. Contractors can make novel proposals to owners, and society benefits from such 
innovation.  
 
Craig (2000) develops these issues and asks three questions on procurement and 
innovation. The first is whether tendering processes encourage innovation. He suggests the 
essential of tendering is that all tenderers are to be treated equally, and that contract award 
criteria are established in advance and known by all parties, thus creating a transparent 
award process. Tendering rules produce direct price competition for a specified product. The 
question then becomes: can traditional tendering processes permit innovation? His answer 
is that a successful tenderer's scope to be innovative is very limited. There is opportunity to 
maximise profits within the tender price by novel ways of organising work or 'bid shopping' to 
drive down subcontract prices. But bidders are not asked to put forward design suggestions, 
there are no criteria for evaluation of novel proposals, and tenderers cannot be treated 
equally if one is preferred on an alternative tender, which is non-conforming in terms of the 
original invitation.  
 
Finally, Craig (2000) asks whether D&B as a procurement system more easily permits 
innovation. The point is made that using the tender process to competitively evaluate design, 
capability, time and cost is not easy, and the integrity of the process has to be safeguarded. 
Craig concludes that the traditional tendering process for building works does not encourage 
design innovation by tenderers, but it has always been possible for tenderers to seek 
competitive advantage through novel construction methods. The potential for innovation in 
D&B is there, but may not be easy to realise.   
 
This argument by Craig can be extended to other non-traditional forms of procurement 
where the client has the opportunity to encourage innovative solutions. These would include 
build, own, operate (BOO), and build and maintain (B&M) contracts, where the long-term 
performance and maintenance costs of the facility are important factors in design decisions. 
This also applies to PPP or PFI projects, and other concessions that transfer back to the 
government at the end of the contract, with condition specifications to be met. 
 
Clients and Innovation 
Ivory (2005) argued clients will avoid risk associated with innovation on their projects. He 
found clients act as a significant barrier to innovation because they are concerned about 
both construction budgets and operating costs, and do not think they will benefit significantly 
from a successful innovation. Further, he suggests clients carry a „disproportionate‟ share of 
innovation risk and as a result “should not be routinely expected to take on the risks (in 
terms of cost and time overruns or poor building performance) and costs associated with 
innovation”(2005: 868-9).   
 
While Ivory‟s argument might be generally true, the exceptions prove the rule. Therefore the 
second case looked at here is the Heathrow Terminal 5 (T5) project. This project 
demonstrates the effect a determined client with a clear strategy to encourage innovation in 
order to improve performance can have. The project has been extensively documented 
elsewhere (including the book by Doherty 2008), so this discussion visits the main points 
and provides references for the supporting detail. 
 
In its role as the client BAA took on all the risk for the ₤4.3 billion project, under the unique 
T5 Agreement that the 60 first tier contractors signed. In total, 15,000 suppliers were 
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involved. The overall project was divided into 147 sub-projects, with an integrated team led 
by BAA responsible for each one. Unlike the majority of megaprojects, T5 was delivered on 
time and on budget (Wolstenholme, Fugeman and Hammond 2008). To achieve its 
objectives BAA implemented a comprehensive strategy to change both its own capabilities 
and those of its main suppliers. Brady et al. (2007) looked at the role of BAA, how it applied 
lessons from previous projects, its interaction with the networks of firms involved and how 
their capabilities were developed. Consultants were sent by BAA into the major suppliers to 
identify ways and means to improve their efficiency and the Agreement included gain 
sharing when cost targets were bettered (Davies, Gann and Douglas 2009).  
 
The key relevant point about T5 is that innovations in many forms were actively sought out 
and developed. These included product innovations in off-site fabrication such as the roof 
structure (Franklin and Hulme 2008), technological innovations such as the tunnelling 
process and equipment (Williams 2008), process innovations such as the two logistics 
centres (Potts 2008), and management innovations such as the insurance provisions and 
incentives built into the T5 Agreement, Deakin and Koukiadaki (2009) detail the industrial 
relations aspects of the project. 
 
Caldwell, Roehrich and Davies (2009) suggest that the risk associated with these large, 
complex projects can provide the motivation for clients to pursue and reward innovation by 
contractors and suppliers. By taking on and actively managing project risk, BAA was able to 
purse a strategy of rewarding performance enhanced by innovations from all participants. 
Following on from T5 is the wider case for alliance contracting. In particular, the expectation 
of knowledge sharing by the participants and the effect of working in integrated teams (see 
Gil 2009 in particular for detail on, and analysis of, the workings and outcomes of the many 
aspects of the alliance relationships on T5). 
 
Conclusion  
Tatum‟s (1986, 1989) characteristics of the construction industry represent a widely applied 
model of construction industry innovation. From the viewpoint of the economics of innovation 
and endogenous growth theories, most of these characteristics are not drivers of innovation, 
and such a model of the industry therefore excludes the main sources of innovation 
identified by those theories. This paper has explored the applicability of some of these ideas 
to construction innovation. 
 
The comparatively low level of investment in innovation appears to be a result of 
construction being a mature, highly competitive industry with limited scope for knowledge 
externalities. In particular, the combination of individual procurement of heterogeneous 
products by clients and increasing specialisation and sub-contracting within the industry 
significantly limits the scope and potential for positive knowledge externalities, as argued by 
Dubois and Gadde (2002). This is despite the industry‟s project-based form of organisation 
(Hobday 2000) and the opportunities for innovation in service industry firms (Gann and 
Salter 2000).  
 
Research into the economics of innovation has shown investment in R&D has a significant 
effect on industry growth, but the effect of R&D is most pronounced where technological 
opportunity is high. The general results of Sutton‟s research can be applied to the 
construction industry where most of the technical advances of the last four decades have 
come from the materials suppliers and equipment manufacturers, who have been 
responsible for the R&D leading to the introduction of new products and equipment, such as 
building facades, power tools and lifts. Many generic technologies such as IT and 
telecommunications have also impacted on the building and construction process, 
particularly in the design professions, but at a significantly slower pace than in other 
industries such as retailing and finance.  
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The act of investment in innovation, and the associated human and physical capital, 
generates knowledge externalities. However, the traditional tendering process used by 
construction industry clients has them typically select on price and not pay for innovation in 
particular or intellectual property in general. This does not allow tenderers to appropriate the 
benefits of knowledge, thus removing the main incentive to innovation identified by 
endogenous growth theory. As argued by Craig, this has two main causes, firstly, an 
innovative tender will probably not be a conforming tender. Secondly, the client gets the 
benefit of the design and/or construct solutions of all tenderers, and can revise the project or 
recall tenders.  
 
Procurement has thus become a more central issue to the industry because the method of 
project procurement used by the client determines the nature of competition in the industry, 
and this in turn determines the role and extent of innovation on their projects. BAA showed 
on T5 that innovation can be a strategic option on complex projects, if the client is prepared 
to manage the risks involved. One of the striking features of the T5 project was the incentive 
structure produced a wide range of innovations across many different sub-projects that 
made up the project as a whole. 
 
More generally, the move away from traditional procurement systems will have significant 
effects on innovation. Because the traditional design-bid-build method does not allow for 
capture of intellectual property and knowledge externalities by contractors in their tenders, 
there was a perverse disincentive to innovate. With the increased use of non-traditional 
procurement methods such as design and construct, D&B, build, own, operate, and build 
and maintain, this disincentive is removed and firms can more easily appropriate the benefits 
of innovation and R&D over the extended life of these contracts or concessions. 
 
The influence of procurement methods appears to be a determining factor in the level of 
innovation in the construction industry, and the significance of increased use of alternative 
forms of procurement lies in the opportunity for increased R&D and innovation they provide. 
In the past, the level of innovation may have been an outcome of industry structure, not a 
determinant. However a more R&D intensive industry would tend toward having structure 
determined by research intensity. As R&D expenditure increases the potential level of 
concentration also rises, and this should be seen in the sectors of the industry where large, 
complex projects that require intellectual property and innovation  are common. The interplay 
between these factors may determine the eventual number of large firms in construction 
industry sectors where national, international and global contractors compete.  
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